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Abstract
We consider a type discipline for the Ambient Calculus that associates ambients
with security levels and constrains them to be traversed by or opened in ambients
of higher security clearance only. We present a bottom-up algorithm that, given an
untyped process P, computes a minimal set of constraints on security levels such
that all actions during runs of P are performed without violating the security level
priorities. Such an algorithm appears to be a prerequisite to use type systems to
ensure security properties in the web scenario.
1 Introduction
The Ambient Calculus [CG98] has recently been successfully proposed was a
model for the Internet and the sort of (mobile) computations that can take
place on it. Ambients provide the abstraction for named locations: they
may contain processes and sub-ambients, while ¼-calculus-like processes inside
ambients are a natural representation of (concurrent) computations. A process
may:
² communicate asynchronously with processes in the same ambient;
² cause the enclosing ambient to move inside or outside other ambients;
² destroy the boundary of a sub-ambient, causing the contents of the sub-
ambient to be released into the parent ambient.
In order to enrich the algebraic theory of ambients, [LS00] introduced the
Safe Ambient Calculus, where process activities are more ¯nely controlled by
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means of coactions. The basic idea here is that an ambient can be traversed
or opened if a process inside it agrees.
A standard way of forbidding unwanted behaviours is to impose a type
discipline. Di®erent type disciplines have been proposed for the Ambient Cal-
culus: types in [CG99] assure the correctness of communications, while the
type system of [CGG99] in addition guarantees that only ambients declared as
`mobile' actually move and only ambients declared as `openable' are opened.
Adding subtyping as in [Zim00b] allows us to obtain a more °exible type dis-
cipline. Finally, using `group names', [CGG00] allows the type of an ambient
n to control the set of ambients n may cross and the set of ambients it may
open. Moreover, dynamic private group names creation provides a °exible
way of preventing unwanted names propagation.
A powerful type discipline for the Safe Ambient Calculus has been devised
in [LS00] whose main features are the control of ambient mobility and the
removing of grave interferences, i.e. of all non-deterministic choices between
logically incompatible interactions. This is achieved using types which can be
derived only for single-threaded ambients, i.e. ambients which at every step
o®er at most one interaction with external or internal ambients. The Secure
Safe Ambient Calculus of [BC01] is a typed variant of Safe Ambients in which
ambient types are protection domains expressing behavioural invariants.
Security plays a crucial role in the theory and practice of distributed sys-
tems. In [DCS00] a type discipline is proposed for safe mobile ambients that
is motivated essentially by its ensuring security properties. The type of an
ambient name speci¯es a security level s and type correctness requires that
an ambient at security level s can only be traversed or opened by ambients
at security levels at least s. Two independent partial orders are de¯ned on
security levels to control respectively opening and movement rights. A gen-
eral analysis of how to encode mandatory security policies inside the Ambient
Calculus is carried out in [BCC01b]. Di±culties therein in ¯nding a natural
interpretation of basic notions like read and write access led the authors to
introduce a variant of the Ambient Calculus, the Boxed Ambients [BCC01a].
Mobile ambients have been analysed also using proof systems [CG00], ab-
stract interpretations [HJNN99], and °ow analysis [DLB00].
This work presents a bottom-up algorithm for the type system introduced
in [DCS00] that, given an untyped process P, computes a minimal set of con-
straints on security levels (i.e. a minimal partial order on security levels) such
that all actions occurring during runs of P are performed without violating
the security level priorities. Such an algorithm is proved to be sound and
complete. We also show it consistent with the calculus reductions, i.e. the
constraints computed on a process reduct are related to those computed on
the process itself via an embedding of constraints relation. As we shall see, in
a sense a reduction loosens the computed constraints. Lastly, we show that
our algorithm gives information about group typing as de¯ned in [CGG00].
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In order to simplify the de¯nition of the algorithm and its analysis, we
ignore coactions, distinctions between movement and opening rights, and re-
strict communication to names only (rather than capabilities). Correctness,
completeness and minimality are proved with respect to a simpli¯ed version
of the type system in [DCS00].
Except for the distributed system calculus de¯ned in [BC01], type systems
for ambients consider the network as a whole, globally typed entity. This is
an unrealistic model for the web, where agents typically interact with only
partial knowledge of each other. And it is even more unrealistic when we try
to model security properties, because attackers need not obey the rules of our
type system. Algorithms such as ours move a step towards an e®ective use of
type systems to ensure security properties in the global computing scenario,
as they can infer useful information even when partial or no type assumptions
are available. More precisely, ambients can derive a minimal set of constraints
on security levels necessary for an untyped process to be well-typed, and on
the basis of such information, they can then decide whether or not to allow
the process in, and with what privileges.
2 Calculus and Types
We focus on a version of the Ambient Calculus where only names can be
communicated. Under this hypothesis the syntactic distinction between ex-
pressions and processes becomes redundant, and the syntax can be given as in
Fig. 1, where n ranges over the set N of ambient names. It is worth remark-
ing that our removing capability passing does not a®ect the expressiveness of
the Ambient Calculus, as shown in [Zim00a] for even more severe restrictions.
Reduction is the binary relation on terms generated by the rules in Fig. 1.
We use (m open n) (resp. (m in n) and (m out n)) to indicate reductions
involving a (Red open)-reduction (resp. (Red in) and (Red out)) that targets
ambient n and happens inside ambient m.
The structural congruence ´ is de¯ned as the least congruence such that:
² j and 0 form a commutative monoid up to ´;
² !P ´ !P j P; (ºn)0 ´ 0; (ºn)(P j Q) ´ (ºn)P j Q (for n not free in Q);
and (ºn)(ºm)P ´ (ºm)(ºn)P.
Although it is possible to consider re¯ned notions of structural congruence, as
e.g. in [CG00], their adoption here is orthogonal to our development.
As mentioned earlier, we shall present a type assignment system that en-
ables to infer judgements on processes expressing their abiding to constraints
on permissions to open or cross boundaries. Then we shall present an algo-
rithm to compute the minimal set of constraints.
We consider a set of type-level names, the security levels, U, and a set
of type variables VarT, ranged over by ®;®0;:::, together with the constant
type Shh that represents the absence of message exchanges. We shall use
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P;Q ::= Processes
0 (inactivity) in n:P (can enter into n)
out n:P (can exit out of n) open n:P (can open n)
n[P] (ambient) (ºn)P (restriction)
P j Q (parallel) !P (replication)
(x):P (input action) hni (output action)
n[in m:Q j Q0] j m[R] ¡! m[n[Q j Q0] j R] (Red in)
m[n[out m:Q j Q0] j R] ¡! n[Q j Q0] j m[R] (Red out)
open n:Q j n[Q0] ¡! Q j Q0 (Red open)
hni j (x):P ¡! Pfx := ng (Red I/O)
P ¡! Q ) P j R ¡! Q j R (Red par)
P ¡! Q ) (ºn)P ¡! (ºn)Q (Red res)
P ¡! Q ) n[P] ¡! n[Q] (Red amb)
P 0 ´ P P ¡! Q Q ´ Q0 ) P 0 ¡! Q0 (Red ´)
Fig. 1. Processes and Reduction
metavariables S, O, and O to denote, respectively, subsets, preorders and
partial orders on U, and write s ·O s0 for (s;s0) 2 O.
De¯nition 2.1 (Ambient Types and Schemes) Types are generated by
T ::= ± j s[T];
where ± ranges over VarT [ fShhg, and s over U. Generic types will be
indicated by T;T0;::: and ¨ will denote the set of types.
Ambient types, denoted by T;T 0;:::, are types that contain no elements of
VarT. The set of ambient types will be indicated by T .
Ambient type schemes, denoted by ¿;¾;:::, are types in which Shh does not
occur. The set of ambient type schemes will be indicated by T S.
We formalise typing environments as partial functions from names to types.
Re°ecting the classi¯cation of types introduced above, we use E, E, and E to
denote elements of, respectively, ¥ = N * ¨, N * T , and N * T S. Also,
if E(n) = s[T], then nE will denote s; and if E and E0 have disjoint domains,
then E¢E0 stands for partial function formed as their union. In particular, we
write E¢n:T when E0 = f(n;T)g.
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We start by lifting functions from sets to ambient type schemes and to
environments.
De¯nition 2.2 A map ':(dom(O) ! dom(O0))[(VarT ! ¨) de¯nes maps
x'y:¨ ! ¨ and p'q:¥ ! ¥ as follows
x'y(®) = '(®); x'y(s[T]) = '(s)[x'y(T)]
p'q(E) = x'y ± E:
In the following we regularly omit explicit mention of x y and p q.
These elements will be employed in tuples either of the form hE;O;S;Ti
(for the type assignment system) or hE;O;S;¿i (for the type inference algo-
rithm). For the time being, we give the de¯nition below using generic types
so to capture all cases of interest at once.
De¯nition 2.3 (Relation /) The binary relation / on tuples of the shape
hE;O;S;Ti, with S µ dom(O) is de¯ned by
hE;O;S;Ti / hE
0;O
0;S
0;T
0i
if there exists ':(dom(O) ! dom(O0)) [ (VarT ! ¨) such that
² '(E) µ E0;
² ' is monotone as a preorder map O ! O0;
² 8s 2 S 9s0 2 S0:'(s) ·O0 s0;
² '(T) = T0.
3 An assignment system for security level constraints
Our aim is to infer judgements on security policies expressed by permissions
to cross boundaries and granted according to security levels associated with
ambients. We use a mapping E to describe the type associated to each ambient
n. Ambient types describe the security level of ambients and, recursively, the
security levels of the names that can be exchanged inside n. The information
provided by E is complemented by a partial order O that describes the pri-
ority relations between security levels that the given security policy dictates.
The central judgement in our assignment system sounds as `P abides by the
constraints E and O', whose meaning can be informally explained as: if, in
any possible reduction sequence of a process abiding by E and O, a reduction
makes an ambient n (resp. a process inside n) enter or exit (resp. open) an
ambient m, then the security level associated to n is not less than the one
associated to m, that is nE ¸O mE.
De¯nition 3.1 Process P abides by the constraints E;O, written E;O ` ok P,
if for all sequences of reductions P ¡!¤ terminating with (n in m), (n out m),
or (n open m) reductions, where m;n are free names in P, we have nE ¸O mE.
The system proposed in Fig. 2 is essentially a simpli¯cation of the system
of [DCS00]. Its purpose is check both E;O ` ok P and the soundness of name
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exchanging. We thus derive more informative judgements, viz. E;O ` P : S;T
where S µ dom(O) and S;T is a process type as de¯ned below.
De¯nition 3.2 (Process Types) A process type F is a pair (S;T), with S µ
U and T 2 T .
The ¯rst component of a process type contains the security levels of the
ambient names involved in capabilities possibly performed by the process; the
second is the ambient type of the names it exchanges. Concerning the rules,
(in `), (out `) and (open `) verify that the security level s of the target
ambient name n is bounded by at least one security level in S. Further to
that, (open `) checks that the type T of the ambient names exchanged by
P and inside n coincide. Rule (Proc Amb `), instead, veri¯es that:
² all security levels in S (which are those of the capabilities possibly performed
by P) are bounded by the security level s of the ambient n;
² the type T of the ambient names exchanged by P and inside n coincide.
3.1 Properties
To relate the type assignment system to a type inference algorithm, we ¯nd
it useful to derive a weakening lemma that uses the relation / introduced in
De¯nition 2.3.
Lemma 3.3 (Weakening) If hE;O;S;Ti / hE0;O0;S0;T 0i, then
E;O ` P : S;T ) E
0;O
0 ` P : S
0;T
0:
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of E;O ` P : S;T. We
consider only one paradigmatic case.
If the last rule applied is (in `) we have:
E;O ` P : S;T nE = s0 9s1 2 S:s0 ·O s1
(in `)
E;O ` in n:P : S;T
By the induction hypothesis, we have E0;O0 ` P : S0;T 0. Let ' be the map
which shows hE;O;S;Ti / hE0;O0;S0;T 0i. If nE0 = s0
0, we get '(s0) = s0
0.
Since 8s 2 S 9s0 2 S0:'(s) ·O0 s0, we can ¯nd s2 2 S0 such that '(s1) ·O0 s2.
Being ' monotone as a preorder map O ! O0 we get s0
0 ·O0 s2. Therefore,
we can infer, by rule (in `), E0;O0 ` in n:P : S0;T 0 as follows:
E
0;O
0 ` P : S
0;T
0 nE0 = s
0
0 9s2 2 S
0:s
0
0 ·O0 s2
(in `)
E
0;O
0 ` in n:P : S
0;T
0
2
As is to be expected, system ` assigns the same type to structurally con-
gruent processes, and such types are preserved under reduction. The proofs
here proceed by induction on ´ and ¡!. We only consider some interesting
cases.
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(Proc 0 `)
E;O ` 0 : S;T
E ¢n : T0;O ` P : S;T
(Proc Res `)
E;O ` (ºn)P : S;T
E;O ` P : S;T nE = s 9s0 2 S:s ·O s0
(in `)
E;O ` in n:P : S;T
E;O ` P : S;T nE = s 9s0 2 S:s ·O s0
(out `)
E;O ` out n:P : S;T
E;O ` P : S;T E(n) = s[T] 9s0 2 S:s ·O s0
(open `)
E;O ` open n:P : S;T
E;O ` P : S;T E(n) = s[T] 8s0 2 S:s0 ·O s
(Proc Amb `)
E;O ` n[P] : S0;T0
E;O ` P : S;T E;O ` Q : S;T
(Proc Par `)
E;O ` P j Q : S;T
E;O ` P : S;T
(Proc Repl `)
E;O ` !P : S;T
E ¢x : T;O ` P : S;T
(Proc Input `)
E;O ` (x):P : S;T
(Proc Output `)
E ¢n : T;O ` hni : S;T
Fig. 2. Type Assignment System
Theorem 3.4 (Subject Congruence of `) If P ´ Q and E;O ` P : F, then
E;O ` Q : F.
Theorem 3.5 (Subject Reduction of `) If E;O ` P : S;T and P ¡! Q,
then E;O ` Q : S;T.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation of P ¡! Q. We
present the cases for (Red in) and (Red open) in the details.
(Red in) n[in m:P j Q] j m[R] ¡! m[n[P j Q] j R].
It is easy to check that a derivation for E;O ` n[in m:P j Q] j m[R] : S;T
must be of the shape
(D1)
. . .
E;O ` R : S
00;T
00 E(m) = s
00[T
00] 8s
0 2 S
00:s
0 ·O s
00
E;O ` m[R] : S;T
E;O ` n[in m:P j Q] j m[R] : S;T
where D1 is
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. . .
E;O ` P : S
0;T
0 mE = s
00 9s
0 2 S
0:s
00 ·O s
0
E;O ` in m:P : S
0;T
0
. . .
E;O ` Q : S
0;T
0
E;O ` in m:P j Q : S
0;T
0 E(n) = s[T
0] 8s
0 2 S
0:s
0 ·O s
(D1)
E;O ` n[in m:P j Q] : S;T
We can now build a derivation for the judgement E;O ` m[n[P j Q] j R] :
S;T as follows. . . .
E;O ` P : S
0;T
0
. . .
E;O ` Q : S
0;T
0
E;O ` P j Q : S
0;T
0 E(n) = s[T
0] 8s
0 2 S
0:s
0 ·O s
(D2)
E;O ` n[P j Q] : S
00;T
00
(D2)
. . .
E;O ` R : S
00;T
00
E;O ` n[P j Q] j R : S
00;T
00 E(m) = s
00[T
00] 8s
0 2 S
00:s
0 ·O s
00
E;O ` m[n[P j Q] j R] : S;T
(Red open) open n:P j n[Q] ¡! P j Q.
It is easy to check that a derivation for open n:P j n[Q] must be of the
shape:
(D3)
. . .
E;O ` Q : S
0;T E(n) = s[T] 8s
00 2 S
0:s
00 ·O s
E;O ` n[Q] : S;T
E;O ` open n:P j n[Q] : S;T
with . . .
E;O ` P : S;T E(n) = s[T] 9s
0 2 S:s ·O s
0
(D3)
E;O ` open n:P : S;T
Conditions 9s0 2 S:s ·O s0 and 8s00 2 S0:s00 ·O s imply that 8s00 2 S0 9s0 2
S:s00 ·O s0. So we get hE;O;S0;Ti / hE;O;S;Ti by choosing as ' the
identity map. Then we can apply the Weakening Lemma (Lemma 3.3) in
order to obtain E;O ` Q : S;T. Finally we can build a derivation for P j Q
in the following way.
. . .
E;O ` P : S;T
. . .
E;O ` Q : S;T
E;O ` P j Q : S;T
2
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We close this section by stating formally that our type assignment system
can type a process P with respect to a given environment and partial order
only if P abides by them (according to De¯nition 3.1).
Theorem 3.6 (Soundness of `) If E;O ` P : S;T then E;O ` ok P.
Proof. Let E;O ` P : S;T and P ¡!¤ Q ¡! R where the last reduction
step is (n open m) and m;n are free names in P. Then there is Q0 ´ Q such
that Q0 has a subterm of the shape n[open m:S j m[U] j V ]. By Subject
Reduction Theorem (Theorem 3.5) we get E;O ` Q : S;T, which implies
E0;O ` n[open m:S j m[U] j V ] : S0;T 0 for some E0 ¶ E, S0;T 0. Looking
at the typing rules (open `) and (Proc Amb `), we get nE0 ¸O mE0. We
conclude nE ¸O mE since by hypothesis m;n are free.
The proofs for the other cases are similar. 2
4 A minimal constraints algorithm
In this section, we address the problem of ¯nding, for a given untyped process
P, a `minimal' set of constraints that P abides by.
De¯nition 4.1 (Minimal Effects) A minimal e®ect F is a tuple hE;O;S;¿i
whose components are as described in the notational conventions of Section 2.
The bottom-up algorithm described in Fig. 3 enables to infer judgements
of the shape
° P : F
where P is a process, and F is a minimal e®ect. If the algorithm computes a
minimal e®ect hE;O;S;¿i for a process P, this will be such that:
² E contains the inferred type assumptions about free names of P;
² S includes security levels associated to the names involved in the capabilities
possibly performed by P;
² O represents the minimal order relation on security levels for P to be well-
typed; and
² ¿ represents the ambient type scheme of the names exchanged by P.
Before discussing the rules in the details, let us observe that, although we
¯nally want to express the constraints on P as a partial order of security levels,
we ¯nd it convenient to work with preorders, as they simplify considerably the
rules of Fig. 3. In particular, they allow us to de¯ne the following operations
on e®ects independently of their environments.
De¯nition 4.2 (Operations on Preorders) Let O;O0 µ U £ U be preorders
of security levels.
We de¯ne O © O0 to be the preorder induced by the union of O and O0, i.e.
the transitive closure of O [ O0.
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® fresh
(Proc 0 °)
° 0 : h?;?;?;®i
° P : hE;O;S;¿i
(Proc Res °)
° (ºn)P : hE r n;O;S;¿i
° P : hE;O;S;¿i nX = s X = En
(in °)
° in n:P : hX;O[s = s];S [ fsg;¿i
° P : hE;O;S;¿i nX = s X = En
(out °)
° out n:P : hX;O[s = s];S [ fsg;¿i
° P : hE;O;S;¿i X(n) = s[¾] X = En
(open °)
° open n:P : hXf¾ = ¿g;O[s = s][¾ = ¿];S [ fsg;max(¾;¿)i
° P : hE;O;S;¿i X(n) = s[¾] X = En ® fresh
(Proc Amb °)
° n[P] : hXf¾ = ¿g;(S"s © O)[¾ = ¿];?;®i
° P : hE;O;S;¿i ° Q : hE0;S0;O0;¾i
(Proc Par °)
° P j Q : h(E ¢E0)f¾ = ¿g;(O
M
E;E0
O0)[¾ = ¿];S [ S0;max(¾;¿)i
° P : F
(Proc Repl °)
° !P : F
® fresh
(Proc Output °)
° hni : hn : ®;?;?;®i
° P : hE;O;S;¿i Ex(x) = ¾
(Proc Input °)
° (x):P : h(E r x)f¾ = ¿g;O[¾ = ¿];S;max(¾;¿)i
Fig. 3. Minimal Constraints Algorithm
For S a set of security levels, and s a security level, S"s is the preorder where
s is added to S as the top element. Formally:
S
"s = f(s;s)g [ f(s
0;s) j s
0 2 Sg [ f(s
0;s
0) j s
0 2 Sg
We use O[s · s0] for O © f(s;s0)g and O[s = s0] for O[s · s0][s0 · s].
Let ¾ = s1[:::sn[®]:::] and ¿ = s0
1[:::s0
m[°]:::] be ambient type schemes.
We de¯ne
max(¾;¿) =
8
<
:
¾ if n ¸ m
¿ if n < m
De¯nition 4.3 (Unification of Ambient Type Schemes) For ® 6= °, let ¾ =
s1[:::sn[®]:::] and ¿ = s0
1[:::s0
m[°]:::] be ambient type schemes, and assume
max(¾;¿) = ¿. The uni¯cation of ¾ and ¿ produces the set of equations
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si = s0
i, (1 · i · n), and the substitution f® Ã s0
n+1[:::s0
m[°]:::]g. We shall
use:
² Ef¾ = ¿g to denote the environment obtained from E, by replacing all
occurrences of ® with s0
n+1[:::s0
m[°]:::];
² O[¾ = ¿] to denote the preorder O[s1 = s0
1]¢¢¢[sn = s0
n].
The uni¯cation of ambient type schemes is central in our construction to
express the constraints involved in parallel composition of processes { rule
(Proc Par) in Fig. 3 { where we need to compose preorders equating the
security levels associated to the same ambient names. This is formalised as:
O
M
E;E0
O
0 = (O © O
0)[E(n) = E
0(n)]n2dom(E)\dom(E0)
Finally, we will be building environments by means of the operations below.
E
n =
8
<
:
E if n 2 dom(E)
E;n : s[®] if n 62 dom(E) with s;® fresh
E r n=
8
<
:
E n fn : E(n)g if n 2 dom(E)
E if n 62 dom(E)
Moreover, we extend the notation E ¢E0 to non necessarily disjoint E and
E0 by de¯ning (E ¢E0)(n) = max(E(n);E0(n)) if n 2 dom(E) \ dom(E0).
Getting back to Fig. 3, we can now discuss the details of the formal de¯ni-
tion of the algorithm. At the beginning, as formalised in the (Proc 0) rule, no
relation among security levels exists. The environment is empty and there is
no information about names exchanged or involved in capabilities potentially
performed by the processes. Capabilities in n and out n cause the name n to
be inserted in the environment, if not already present, and the security level
associated to n to be inserted in the set of e®ects S (notice the use of X in the
rules to indicate that the same level is associated to n both in premises and in
the conclusions). In the typing of a process of the shape open n:P, we have to
take care that, after the opening of the ambient n, processes running inside n
will run in parallel with P, and hence we have to unify the type exchanged by
P with the type exchanged inside n. According to our security policy, to infer
the type of a process of the shape n[P], we need to impose that the security
level of n is greater or equal to those of names involved in capabilities possibly
performed by P. When two processes P and Q are put in parallel, we need
to unify types exchanged by P and Q, and compute an order among security
levels, which contains those calculated for P and Q. In the typing of an input
action, (x):P, we need to unify the type of the expected value with the type
of messages exchanged by P. The algorithm has to take care of scope rules
of the calculus, removing from the environment names which become bound
because of an input action or a restriction.
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° 0 : h?;?;?;®0i
(D1)
° open m:0 : hfm : s2[®2]g;f(s2;s2)g;fs2g;®0i
° 0 : h?;?;?;®4i
° out n:0 : hfn : s1[®1]g;f(s1;s1)g;fs1g;®4i
(D2)
° m[out n:0] : hfn : s1[®1];m : s3[®3]g;f(s1;s1);(s3;s3);(s1;s3)g;?;®5i
(D1) (D2)
° P j Q : hfn : s1[®1];m : s2[®2]g;f(s1;s1);(s2;s2);(s1;s2)g;fs2g;®0i
° n[P j Q] : hfn : s1[®1];m : s2[®2]g;f(s1;s1);(s2;s2);(s1;s2);(s2;s1)g;?;®6i
Fig. 4. Example of type inference (P ´ open m:0 and Q ´ m[out n:0])
At the end, we obtain associations between free ambient names and type
schemes in the environment and a preorder relation among security levels.
Fig. 4 gives an example of derivation.
4.1 Properties
As for the type assignment system, our algorithm enjoys the expected proper-
ties: it infers isomorphic e®ects for structural congruent processes and com-
putes looser e®ects after reductions. Reduction in fact loosens the minimal
constraints on a process, because these depend on the potential execution of
capabilities that disappear under reduction. In the following de¯nitions, we
formalise the notions of isomorphic e®ects and loosened constraints.
De¯nition 4.4 (Partial Order Collapse) For F = hE;O;S;¿i an e®ect, its
partial order collapse is the e®ect F´ = hE=´;O=´;S=´;¿=´i where =´ is
a quotient map 1 for the equivalence relation ´ =def ·O \ ¸O. To improve
proof readability, we occasionally denote the tuple hE=´;O=´;S=´;¿=´i as
hE;O;S;¿i.
Note that partial order collapses are a special kind of e®ects, since their
preorder component is actually a partial order. We call them ordered e®ects.
Ordered e®ects are relevant to our development because, as it will be evident
shortly, they represent the essence of e®ects and provide a bridge to ambient
types. In particular, if our rules allow to infer ° P : F, then the essential
information given by our algorithm is contained in F´.
1 We convene that =´ chooses a canonical representative for each class and maps security
levels accordingly, as the canonical quotient map x 7! [x]=´ would not yield an e®ect for
trivial reasons.
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De¯nition 4.5 (The Relation ./ on Ordered Effects) Let F = hE;O;S;¿i
and F0 = hE0;O0;S0;¿0i be ordered e®ects. We say that F ./ F0 if F / F0 (as
de¯ned in De¯nition 2.3) via a map ' which is an isomorphism between S
and S0 and between O and O0.
De¯nition 4.6 (Effects Inequalities and Isomorphism) E®ect F is re¯ned by
e®ect F0, notation F Á F0, if F´ / F0
´. E®ect F is isomorphic to e®ect F0,
notation F » = F0, if F´ ./ F0
´.
We can prove that » = is a congruence with respect to all the e®ect trans-
formations used to de¯ne our minimal constraints algorithm.
Lemma 4.7 Let F » = F0, ° P : F and ° P : F0. If ° P : F is a premise
and ° Q : F00 is the conclusion of an arbitrary rule of the minimal constraints
algorithm, then if we apply the same rule using as premise ° P : F0 instead of
° P : F, we get as conclusion ° Q : F000 with F00 » = F000.
As formally stated by the lemma below, the system ° infers an e®ect for
each well-formed process: at worst, all security levels will be equated, making
our security policy void. The proof by structural induction on processes using
previous lemma is standard.
Lemma 4.8 (Termination) For every P there exists F, unique up to » =, such
that ° P : F.
In analogy to Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 and we get:
Theorem 4.9 (Subject Congruence of °) If P ´ Q, ° P : F and ° Q : F0,
then F » = F0.
Proof. The proof by induction on ´ using Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 is easy. 2
Theorem 4.10 (Loosening by reduction) If ° P : F, and P ¡! Q, and
° Q : F0, then F0 Á F.
Proof. We give a concise proof which stems from relationships between sys-
tems ` and °, discussed in the next section (Theorems 5.2 and 5.3). Let (¢)
¤
be the map replacing Shh to type variables de¯ned in De¯nition 5.1.
Let F = hE;O;S;¿i and F0 = hE0;O0;S0;¿0i. We have that
° P:hE;O;S;¿i
(by Th. 5.2)
®¶
° Q:hE0;O0;S0;¿0i
E
¤
;O ` P : S;¿¤
(by Th. 3.5)
+3E
¤
;O ` Q : S;¿¤
(by Th. 5.3)
KS
where, according to Theorem 5.3, hE0;O0;S0;¿0i / hE
¤
;O;S;¿¤i. It easily
follows that hE0;O0;S0;¿0i Á hE;O;S;¿i. 2
One could argue that it would be quite natural to expect the statement
of the Loosening by Reduction Theorem to hold for a stronger version of the
relation Á, namely the one obtained by adding to the conditions of De¯nition
2.3 the requirement of ' to be injective. This, however, turns out to be
13Barbanera, Dezani, Salvo, and Sassone
impossible, again because by performing a reduction we make the number of
capabilities in a process decrease. Certainly, the fewer the capabilities in a
process, the fewer the pairs in the preorder inferred by our algorithm. However,
as the quotient-order construction is non monotone, a smaller preorder does
not imply a smaller corresponding partial order. This is well illustrated by
process P below, where reduction gets us a smaller preorder, but a bigger
partial order.
P = n[open m:0 j m[out n:out m:0]]
The partial order of constraints for P is simply f(s;s)g, with nE = s and
mE = s, whereas the algorithm computes f(s1;s1);(s2;s2);(s1;s2);(s2;s1)g,
with nE = s1 and mE = s2 (see Fig. 4). If we reduce P via a (Red open)
reduction, we get
n[out n:out m:0]:
It is not di±cult to see that the partial order of constraints is bigger for this
process than for P. In fact it is f(s1;s1);(s2;s2);(s2;s1)g, i.e. it coincides with
the preorder computed by the algorithm.
5 Correctness and Minimality
In this section, we show that the algorithm is correct and complete with respect
to the type assignment system. Moreover, Theorem 5.3 asserts that the e®ect
computed by the algorithm re¯nes (in the sense of De¯nition 4.6) any possible
typing in the type assignment system. To connect the the algorithm with the
type assignment system we need to replace type variables by Shh.
De¯nition 5.1 Let (¢)
¤:VarT ! T be the map such that ®¤ = Shh, for all
® 2 VarT. We lift (¢)
¤ to type schemes and environments in the obvious way.
Theorem 5.2 (Correctness) Let P be a process. IF ° P : hE;O;S;¿i then
E
¤
;O ` P : S;¿¤.
Proof. The proof is by induction on derivations. The details for rule (Proc
Par °) are as follows.
° P : E;O;S;¿ ° Q : E
0;O
0;S
0;¾
(Proc Par °)
° P j Q : (E ¢E
0)f¾ = ¿g;(O
M
E;E0
O
0)[¾ = ¿];S [ S
0;max(¾;¿)
By induction hypothesis, we have E
¤
;O ` P : S;¿¤ and E0¤
;O0 ` Q : S0;¾¤.
By weakening (Lemma 3.3), we have:
((E ¢E0)f¾ = ¿g)
¤
;(O
M
E;E0
O0)[¾ = ¿] ` P : S [ S0;max(¾;¿)
¤
and
((E ¢E0)f¾ = ¿g)
¤
;(O
M
E;E0
O0)[¾ = ¿] ` Q : S [ S0;max(¾;¿)
¤
:
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The statement is proved just by applying the (Proc Par `) rule. 2
The order `computed' by the algorithm is minimal in the following sense.
Theorem 5.3 (Minimality) Let ° P : hE;O;S;¿i and E;O ` P : S0;T.
Then hE;O;S;¿i / hE;O;S0;Ti.
Proof. By induction on derivations. All cases are quite simple, apart from
those of rules (Proc Par) and (Proc Amb), which require some technical inge-
nuity. We ¯rst consider the (Proc Par) rules.
° P : hE;O;S;¿i ° Q : hE
0;O
0;S
0;¾i
(Proc Par °)
° P j Q : h(E ¢ E
0)f¾ = ¿g;(O
M
E;E0
O
0)[¾ = ¿];S [ S
0;max(¾;¿)i
E;O ` P : S
00;T E;O ` Q : S
00;T
(Proc Par `)
E;O ` P j Q : S
00;T
Notice that by construction S \ S0 = ? and FV(E;¿) \ FV(E0;¾) = ?,
where FV gives the set of (free) type variables in ambient type schemes and
environments. Therefore also S \S0 = ? and FV(E;¿)\FV(E0;¾) = ?. By
induction there are 'P and 'Q such that:
² 'P(E) µ E;'Q(E0) µ E;
² 8s 2 S 9s0 2 S00:'P(s) ·O s0;
² 8s 2 S0 9s0 2 S00:'Q(s) ·O s0;
² 'P is monotone as a preorder map O ! O;
² 'Q is monotone as a preorder map O0 ! O;
² 'P(¿) = 'Q(¾) = T:
We de¯ne a map ' as follows:
'(s) =
8
<
:
'P(s) if s 2 S
'Q(s) if s 2 S0
'(®) =
8
<
:
'P(®) if ® 2 FV(E;¿)
'Q(®) if ® 2 FV(E0;¾)
Then
² '((E ¢ E0)f¾ = ¿g) µ E;
² 8s 2 S [ S0 9s0 2 S00:'(s) ·O s0;
² ' is monotone as a preorder map (O
L
E;E0 O0)[¾ = ¿] ! O;
² '(max(¾;¿)) = T:
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For the (Proc Amb) rules, we proceed as follows
° P : hE;O;S;¿i X(n) = s[¾] X = E
n ® fresh
(Proc Amb °)
° n[P] : hXf¾ = ¿g;(S
"s © O)[¾ = ¿];?;®i
E;O ` P : S
00;T E(n) = s
00[T] 8s
0 2 S
00:s
0 ·O s
00
(Proc Amb `)
E;O ` n[P] : S
0;T
0
By induction hypothesis, there is 'P such that:
² 'P(E) µ E;
² 8s 2 S 9s000 2 S00:'P(s) ·O00 s000;
² 'P is monotone as a preorder map O ! O;
² 'P(¿) = T:
We de¯ne
'(s0) =
8
<
:
'P(s0) if s0 2 S
s00 otherwise
'(¯) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
'P(¯) if ¯ 2 FV(E;¿)
T 0 if ¯ ´ ®
T otherwise
If n 2 dom(E), from 'P(E) µ E and 'P(¿) = T, we get 'P(s) = s00, and
'P(¾) = T. Otherwise, s 62 S implies '(s) = s00 and ¾ is a type variable that
does not belong to FV(E;¿)[f®g and hence, by de¯nition of ', we have that
'(¾) = T. In both cases we obtain:
² '(Xf¾ = ¿g) µ E;
² ' is monotone as a preorder map (S"s © O)[¾ = ¿] ! O;
² '(®) = T 0:
This concludes our proof, being the remaining clause trivially satis¯ed for the
empty set. 2
6 Relations with group types
In this section, we draft a relationship between types as considered here and
the group types of [CGG00]. We consider security levels as group names, and
do not distinguish between groups for opening and for moving ambients. The
syntax of group types is then
T := Shh j s[S;T]:
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(Proc 0 `G)
¡ `G 0 : S;T
¡¢n : T0 ` P : S;T
(Proc Res `G)
¡ `G (ºn)P : S;T
¡ `G P : S;T n¡ = s s 2 S
(in `G)
¡ `G in n:P : S;T
¡ `G P : S;T n¡ = s s 2 S
(out `G)
¡ `G out n:P : S;T
¡ `G P : S;T ¡(n) = s[S;T] s 2 S
(open `G)
¡ `G open n:P : S;T
¡ `G P : S;T ¡(n) = s[S;T]
(Proc Amb `G)
¡ `G n[P] : S0;T0
¡ `G P : S;T ¡ `G Q : S;T
(Proc Par `G)
¡ `G P j Q : S;T
¡ `G P : S;T
(Proc Repl `G)
¡ `G!P : S;T
¡¢x : T `G P : S;T
(Proc Input `G)
¡ `G (x):P : S;T
(Proc Output `G)
¡¢n : T `G hni : S;T
Fig. 5. Type Assignment System for Group Types
Let GT stand for the set of group types. The typing rules of [CGG00] with
the types in GT are given in Fig. 5 using the current notational conventions.
There is no surprise here, and the rules are as expected. We denote by `G the
type system so obtained.
De¯nition 6.1 Given a partial order O we de¯ne its downward closure as
SO(s) = fs
0 j s
0 ·O sg; SO(S) =
[
s2S
SO(s)
and the mapping ¹O:¨ ! GT such that
¹O(®) = ¹O(Shh) = Shh; ¹O(s[T]) = s[SO(s);¹O(T)]:
We lift ¹O to environments as usual.
We can prove that ° P : hE;O;S;¿i implies ¹O(E) `G P : SO(S);¹O(¿)
where O is the partial order induced by the preorder O.
Lemma 6.2 E;O ` P : S;T implies ¹O(E) `G P : SO(S);¹O(T).
Proof. By induction on type derivations of `. We only work out the paradig-
matic case when the last rule applied is (Proc Amb `). Let E;O ` n[P] : S0;T 0
17Barbanera, Dezani, Salvo, and Sassone
be the conclusion. This means that, for some S and T, we have derived the
judgement E;O ` P : S;T and that E(n) = s[T], with s greater than every
security level in S. Under such conditions and by de¯nition of SO, we have
that S µ SO(S) µ SO(s). By the Weakening Lemma (Lemma 3.3), we can
derive the judgement E;O ` P : SO(s);T. Applying the induction hypothe-
sis, the judgement ¹O(E) `G P : SO(s);¹O(T) is derivable and ¹O(E)(n) =
s[SO(s);¹O(T)]. We can conclude ¹O(E) `G n[P] : SO(S0);¹O(T 0). 2
Theorem 6.3 ° P : hE;O;S;Ti implies ¹O(E) `G P : SO(S);¹O(T), where
O is the partial order induced by the preorder O.
Proof. Simply by the correctness of the type inference algorithm with respect
to the type assignment system (Theorem 5.2) using the previous lemma. 2
7 Conclusions and Future Works
In the scenario we considered an ambient can enter another when the former
has a greater priority. Although this is quite a reasonable assumption, one has
to be aware that once the ambient has entered its greater security clearance
enables it to do, so to speak, whatever it likes. This is to be avoided if we are
to yield a safer, a more realistic, and thoroughly desirable situation in which
an ambient successfully controls what happens inside itself.
Re°ecting on this, we are naturally led to consider the possibility for an
ambient to assign a safe security level to ambients crossing its boundaries
and, in general, to all its sub-ambients. Moreover the security level of an
ambient can increase when it received an `audit' certi¯cate or decrease when
it crosses an unsafe ambient. A distributed version of our type assignment
and algorithm can provide the right framework to address an extension of the
Ambient Calculus with capabilities allowing security levels modi¯cations as
the ones suggested above.
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